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RATIONAL CHOICE, REPUTATION, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
Alex Geisinger* 
Michael Ashley Stein** 
How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY. By An-
drew T. Guzman. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. 
Pp. vi, 247. $35. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long considered the linked questions of whether and why 
states obey international law. Contemporary contributions to this inquiry 
include schools of thought that aver the bearing of transnational legal proc-
ess on state socialization, 1 the impact of acculturation on state behavior,2 the 
sway of a state's desire to be held in esteem by other international actors,3 
and the influence of a given state's belief in the rule of law.4 Common to 
each of these approaches is the notion that external norms have some effect 
on state action. 
A second group of scholars takes an atomistic, instrumentalist approach. 
Skeptical of normative pressure, they envision states as rational actors seek-
ing to maximize stable and preexisting preferences.5 The most recent 
contribution to this approach is How International Law Works: A Rational 
* Professor, Drexel University College of Law. Written while Professor, Valparaiso Univer-
sity School of Law. 
** Professor, William & Mary School of Law, and Executive Director, Harvard Project on 
Disability. We thank Robert DeRise for research assistance; Bret Asbury, Donald Childress and 
Nancy Combs for comments; and Jane Scarpellino and Penelope Stein for constant support. Profes-
sor Stein's research was partially supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute (Zug). 
I. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DuKE L.J. 975 
(2005) [hereinafter Koh, Internalization]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey]. 
2. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
lnternationai Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Inter-
national Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DuKE 
L.J. 983 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAVES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Alex Geisinger & Michael 
Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REv. 77 (2007). 
4. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
5. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115 (2002). 
1129 
1130 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:1129 
Choice Theory by Andrew T. Guzman.6 The book is an ambitious attempt to 
generate "a comprehensive and coherent theory"-based on the assumption 
that states are rational, self-interested actors-that can explain how interna-
tional law "works across its full spectrum" (pp. 8-9). 
By endeavoring to comprehensively explain international law within a 
rational choice framework, Rational Choice makes a valuable contribution 
to the developing body of international law scholarship. Guzman's efforts to 
more fully describe the reputational aspects of international law within a 
rational choice framework are especially significant.7 It is relatively easy to 
understand how direct economic or material benefits (or detriments) can 
motivate states to enter into or comply with international agreements. How-
ever, the influence of more indistinct reputational forces on the behavior of 
states has been a fertile source of contention between various schools of 
thought in this field. 
Guzman does an admirable job describing the nexus between a state's 
rational self-interest and concern over its reputation among other states. It is, 
however, the limited role played by reputation in the theory as a whole that 
raises serious concerns regarding the book's claim to comprehensiveness. 
The book's focus on cooperation and coordination as the exclusive bases for 
treaty formation relegates reputational forces to playing a role only in treaty 
compliance, not treaty formation. Yet the formation of a considerable com-
ponent of international law comprised by human rights treaties cannot be 
explained solely through the game-theoretic lens of cooperation and coordi-
nation. Because cooperation and coordination games cannot account for the 
formation of human rights treaties-leaving us instead to consider the repu-
tational force behind treaty creation-we are required to reconsider Rational 
Choice's claim that it is a comprehensive theory applicable "to all interna-
tional agreements" (p. 121). If, as we suggest, reputation plays a role in 
treaty formation, a more robust theory of reputation is necessary for any 
rational-choice-based explanation of international law to succeed. We can 
project that some of the strengths and weaknesses revealed by our examina-
tion of human rights treaty formation and compliance carry over into other 
parts of Guzman's theory. 
Part I of this Review sets forth Guzman's general theory of international 
law with specific consideration of the way reputation influences state behav-
ior. Part II then tests Guzman's overarching thesis by applying it to human 
rights treaties and concludes that explaining states' entry into human rights 
treaties requires a broader conception of reputation than Rational Choice 
allows. 
6. Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, UC Berkeley 
School of Law (Boalt Hall). 
7. Of the book's three forces of compliance-retaliation, reciprocity, and reputation--only 
reputation receives in-depth explication in a separate chapter devoted to the subject. For an earlier 
attempt at synthesizing disparate views on international law, see Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of 
International Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 533 (2006) (book review). 
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I. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As with many rational choice accounts of group behavior, Guzman starts 
with cooperation and coordination games to describe how international law 
develops and, ultimately, why states choose to obey their obligations. Ac-
cording to his view, international law reflects the agreements of self-
interested states that cooperate to maximize their individual utility (p. 12); 
more trenchantly, he argues that states "will only enter into agreements" if 
doing so makes them "better off' (p. 121). 
Rational Choice makes its analytical baseline assumptions abundantly 
clear at the outset. The book assumes that states are "rational, self-
interested, and able to identify and pursue their interests," which it presumes 
are "exogenous and fixed," aimed at maximizing "their own gains or pay-
offs," and not concerned with the welfare of other nations (p. 17). As a result 
of this existential view, states "have no innate preference for complying with 
international law, they are unaffected by the 'legitimacy' of a rule of law," 
and "there is no assumption that decision-makers have internalized a norm 
of compliance with international law" (p. 17). Rather, as self-interested ac-
tors, states only enter into agreements that become the embodiment of 
international norms when the subsequent cooperative benefit engenders a 
greater gain than the cost of those obligations. 
Rational Choice begins its analysis by distinguishing "easy" games from 
"hard" games as a means of identifying those situations when international 
law has significant influence on state behavior. Easy games are games where 
international law becomes "superfluous" and does little work to create state 
obligations or to ensure that states comply with them (p. 29). These easy 
games generally take the form of coordination games where the main role of 
international law is to provide a focal point around which states can coordi-
nate their behavior (p. 28). One instance is the Warsaw Convention 
governing international air travel, which establishes such things as air-traffic 
routes so that airlines can ensure their planes will not crash in mid-air (pp. 
26-27). 
By contrast, hard games are generally defined as situations where states 
have a need not to coordinate behavior but to cooperate in order to maxi-
mize their aggregate benefits (pp. 29-30). The classic example of this sort of 
cooperation game is the prisoner's dilemma, which posits two rational, self-
interested individuals who must choose between alternate strategies. Under 
the conditions of this game, pursuit of self-interest leads to worse results for 
each side than if it had cooperated with the other.8 Guzman believes such 
games are prevalent in international relations and therefore focuses on them 
(pp. 121-29). 
Much of Guzman's analysis takes place in the form of applications or 
explanations. For example, to discuss how states rely on international law to 
their benefit in hard cases, Rational Choice turns to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
8. See David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331,373-74 (2001). 
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Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty 
was aimed at solving a problem within the broad area of arms control: the 
states were engaged in a race to the bottom in an almost-unrestrained acqui-
sition of weapons and technology that significantly drained their respective 
resources. Both states wanted to maintain an edge in their nuclear strike ca-
pabilities, but doing so required the creation of more and better nuclear 
weapons than the other. Moreover, efforts to develop a defensive system by 
one state would create significant incentives for the other to upgrade their 
weapons in order to penetrate these defenses (pp. 30-31). 
While both states would benefit from mutual cooperation whereby they 
could limit the resources dedicated to arms production, the dominant strat-
egy for each state was to cheat because of the "potentially enormous payoff 
that would come to whichever side developed the ability to wipe out the 
other's second strike capability" (pp. 30-31). Such a conundrum, of course, 
takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma, and Guzman diagrams the payoffs 
of each strategy as follows9: 
THE ABM TREATY PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
United States Comply Violate 
Soviet Union 
Comply Violate 
(100, 100) (-50, 200) 
(200, -50) (80, 80) 
In such a case, "when doing so makes them (or, at least, their policy-
makers) better off' (p. 121), the United States and the Soviet Union might 
enter an enforceable agreement. According to Guzman, "states enter into 
treaties for the same basic reasons that individuals enter into contracts," 
namely, that these instruments "allow them to resolve problems of coopera-
tion, to commit to a particular course of conduct, and to gain assurances 
regarding what other states will do in the future" (p. 121). This contract 
model underlies Rational Choice's explanation of all treaty formation. 
Of course the willingness to enter into treaties is itself dependent on a 
state's belief that other states will comply with their treaty obligations. 
Guzman turns to the iterated nature of relations between states to describe 
how compliance with treaty terms may arise. He concludes that certain 
forces that arise when games are continuously played can lead states to 
abide by their cooperative agreements. Guzman calls these forces of com-
pliance the "three R's," and it is the three Rs-retaliation, reciprocity, and 
reputation-that are responsible for states' compliance with their interna-
tional obligations (p. 33). Since this theory forms the core of Rational 
Choice, it is worth quoting Guzman's description at length: 
9. P. 32 tbl.l. Note that the problem takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma. Both parties 
are better off if they cooperate (I 00 + I 00 = 200), yet the dominant strategy is always to defect. For 
example, if the Soviet Union complies, the United States' payoffs would be 100 for complying or 
200 for defecting. If the Soviet Union defects, the United States' payoffs would be -50 for comply-
ing or 80 for defecting. 
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The repeated nature of the interactions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union allowed cooperation to take place. Each country valued co-
operation not only in contemporary terms, but also in the future. This gave 
the parties at least three reasons to comply with the treaty. First, and per-
haps most important, is reciprocity. A violation by one side would likely 
provoke a violation by the other side. The one to violate initially would en-
joy a one-period gain, but thereafter the treaty might collapse, in which 
case both parties would return to the noncooperative outcome. Second, 
both parties wanted to be able to make credible commitments in the future. 
By complying with its promises, each country enhanced its reputation as a 
state that honors its commitments and, therefore, its ability to make future 
promises. Third, a violation had the potential to trigger some form of re-
taliatory action, which might further increase the cost of breach. (p. 32) 
Guzman's general theory of treaty formation and compliance between 
rational, self-interested actors can therefore be summarized as follows. Trea-
ties are formed when the pursuit of a state's preferences leads that state to 
desire cooperation from others, but cooperation is hard to attain because the 
payoffs from cooperating are generally lower than the payoffs from defect-
ing. The payoff structure, however, changes when the game is an iterated 
one. Failure to comply with an agreement can lead to one of three undesired 
outcomes: the other states may choose (I) to reciprocate by not complying, 
(2) to retaliate in some other fashion, or (3) not to cooperate with the defect-
ing state in future endeavors because of the defecting state's reputation for 
noncooperation. For Guzman, it is these calculations-and neither an exist-
ing preference for compliance nor a sense of obligation to comply with 
international law-that leads states to honor their obligations (p. 194). 
Rational Choice applies a similar dynamic to explain, respectively, 
compliance with international agreements and customary international law. 
Guzman maintains his firm allegiance to game theory in Rational Choice's 
relatively brief discussion of customary international law at the book's end. 
According to his view, "[i]n a repeated game, customary rules can affect 
behavior in much the same way international agreements do." Accordingly, 
noncompliance with an accepted norm "signals a willingness to ignore in-
ternational legal obligations and thus makes future cooperation more 
difficult" (p. 191). Thus, in the area of customary international law, reputa-
tional concerns again appear alongside retaliation and reciprocity as a force 
of compliance, and neither an internalized sense of obligation to comply 
with international law nor a preference for compliance with international 
law plays a role in affecting state behavior. Rather, "[t]o the extent that state 
behavior is influenced at all, it is as a result of a change in payoffs" (p. 194 ). 
Rational Choice explains further that the power of customary law de-
pends on how states determine which international norms are actually legal 
obligations (p. 195). Only if other states believe that a customary interna-
tional law rule exists will contrary actions "generate a reputational cost" (p. 
194). As Guzman recognizes, "if more states have a belief that a legal obli-
gation exists, the cost of violation will be larger" (p. 195). Thus, the more 
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widely held a belief equating a norm with a legal obligation, the more pow-
erful that obligation becomes as a motivator of compliance. 
Rational Choice thus provides us with a simple and elegant theory of in-
ternational law that maintains unyielding allegiance to game-theoretic 
explanations of state behavior. To Guzman, all international law can be ex-
plained through the lens of rational, self-interested actors working together 
in cases where cooperation or coordination will increase their individual 
welfare. Guzman himself recognizes that his theory is parsimonious, but he 
nevertheless makes claims to its universality (pp. 120-21). One way to test 
the ecumenical reach of such a theory is to apply it to a particular area of 
international law to determine if it can indeed live up to its claims. We do so 
in the next Part. 
II. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, 
AND REPUTATION 
Human rights treaties are an especially rich area in which to assess 
Guzman's rational choice theory of international law. This is because, as 
Harold Koh has recognized, it is not easy to explain such treaties through 
traditional rational choice mechanisms. 10 In particular, and as we will dis-
cuss shortly, it is difficult to describe human rights treaty formation within 
the game-theoretic construct of cooperation or coordination. Similarly, 
compliance with human rights treaties is difficult to explain using only 
mechanisms of retaliation or retribution. 11 
International human rights treaties mainly impact states' conduct toward 
their own citizens. 12 Put simply, it is highly unlikely a state will use sanc-
tions against another state to force the latter's compliance with the terms of 
a mutually signed human rights treaty, even if states do use sanctions to en-
force more general human rights norms. 13 It is equally unlikely that one state 
10. See Koh, Internalization, supra note I, at 979 ("[C]ompliance with international human 
rights rules cannot easily be explained as reciprocity or by reference to a larger cooperation or coor-
dination game."). 
II. One could argue that positive network externalities, even to the extent of financial advan-
tage, can be generated by human rights treaty compliance. That impact, however, is not immediate 
since it requires time to accrete. Moreover, to the extent that monetary advantage is immediate-for 
example, one state reworking its trade relationship with another in return for the latter ratifying a 
given treaty-that influence is coercive. See generally Geisinger & Stein, supra note 3, at 114-16 
(distinguishing persuasion from coercion). 
12. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821, 1823 
(2003) (explaining that parties to human rights treaties "receive only promises from other nations to 
refrain from harming their own citizens"). A notable exception is the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 
2220 U.N.T.S. 3. 
13. Typical examples are United Nations sanctions directed against apartheid-era South 
Africa-and contemporary Sudan-that attempt to force the state to treat its own population more 
humanely. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, U.N. Council Imposes Sanctions on 4 Men in Darfur War Crimes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at AIO; U.N. Passes Measures to Combat Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 1987, at 6. But see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CoNTEXT 662 (2d ed. 2000) ("Although human rights advocates have often proposed the imposition 
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will choose to mistreat its own citizens because another state has failed to 
live up to its treaty obligations under a common instrument. 
If game theory cannot readily explain human rights treaty formation and 
compliance, then legal scholars must turn to other processes to explain their 
existence. Rational Choice explicitly rejects the idea that mechanisms such 
as an internalized desire to comply with international law can influence state 
behavior. 14 We are thus left with reputation as the force by which human 
rights treaty formation must be explained. Accordingly, we examine the sa-
lience of Guzman's rational-actor framework as applied to human rights 
agreements as a means of isolating the effects and understanding the limits 
of the reputational mechanism. 
In Section II.A, we apply Rational Choice's game-theoretic framework 
to the problem of human rights and discuss the framework's limitations. In 
Section II.B, we argue that Guzman's theory of reputation fails to account 
for states' entry into human rights treaties and for state esteem-seeking be-
havior. Finally, in Section II.C, we provide some thoughts on the need for a 
more robust theory of reputation in international law. 
A. Human Rights Treaty Formation 
There has been a virtual explosion of human rights treaties since the cre-
ation of the United Nations after World War II. Guzman explains this 
increase by suggesting that state preferences have evolved since that time to 
include a preference for the provision of human rights to the citizens of 
other states (p. 20). Such a suggestion fits well within Rational Choice's 
game-theoretic framework. As states develop preferences to provide human 
rights to citizens of other states, the treaties they enter will reflect the satis-
faction of these preferences. 
On closer examination, however, Guzman's explanation fails to account 
for the extent of participation in human rights regimes that has been a hall-
mark of the era. Put bluntly, why would the "other" states-the ones 
Guzman suggests do not have human rights practices the majority of states 
desire-join an international regime targeting and condoning those same 
disfavored practices? Why, for example, would a state that prefers using 
child labor enter into an international treaty prohibiting that practice as abu-
sive?15 Such an instrument does not provide the type of cooperative or 
coordinated benefits that Guzman requires as a condition for treaty forma-
tion, and compliance with the treaty would entail significant costs to that 
state. 16 
of sanctions against governments that are violating human rights, increasing doubts have been raised 
in recent years about both their effectiveness and their appropriateness."). 
14. See supra Part I. 
15. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 32, adopted Nov. 
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). 
16. It is possible, as Oona Hathaway has argued, that a state would enter a treaty without 
intending to comply. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1941 (2002). Rational Choice, however, would require that the benefit of entry into 
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For either coordination or cooperation to occur within the realm of ra-
tional-actor theory, the payoffs of cooperation must be greater than the 
costs. If we assume that a state would not want to undertake such protection, 
the benefit must come from another source. 17 Perhaps foreign aid or other 
specific benefits from the international community are held out as condi-
tions for entry into the treaty. That motivation seemingly animates the 
actions of some states aspiring to European Union membership. 18 However, 
such coercion (even when sugarcoated) is atypical for international human 
rights treaty formation or ratification. 19 If direct material or economic bene-
fits are not the reasons states sign on to human rights treaties, then only 
indirect influences such as reputation can explain why states enter into these 
instruments to begin with. We must therefore turn to Rational Choice's de-
scription of reputation and consider whether it provides for the kind of 
influence that can lead to the creation of human rights treaties. 
B. How Reputation Influences State Behavior: The Rational Choice View 
Rational Choice provides a thoughtful analysis of how reputation influ-
ences state behavior. As Guzman points out, he is not the first person to 
consider this phenomenon;20 however, the effort to develop a comprehensive 
reputation model separates his work from others.21 The principles presented 
such a treaty outweigh the reputational Joss that comes with failing to comply. As we discuss, Ra-
tional Choice makes no room for states entering treaties in the absence of such benefit. See infra 
notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
17. The general notion of a preference for altruism is troubling to rational actor theories. 
Goldsmith and Posner, for example, suggest that a preference for benefiting others, as a matter of 
historical probability, is more likely to be based on shared religion, ethnicity, or citizenship than 
altruistic cosmopolitanism. See GoLDSMITH & PosNER, supra note 5, at 109-10. Thus, even with the 
increased altruistic impulse individuals experience toward those sharing a common bond (citizen-
ship, for example), state coercion is still necessary for in-state welfare transfers due to the relatively 
weak altruistic impulse. Accordingly, "[g]iven this relatively weak altruism toward compatriots, we 
should not expect individual altruism to extend to people who are physically and culturally more 
distant." !d. at 212. 
18. For example, in response to a report from Mental Disability Rights International detail-
ing Turkey's routine use of unanesthetized electroshock "therapy" on children with intellectual 
disabilities, the Council of Europe conditioned its future favorable view to Turkey's ascension to the 
European Union on compliance with Turkey's existing international obligations to refrain from 
torture. See MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT'L, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
IN THE PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES, ORPHANAGES AND REHABILITATION CENTERS OF TuRKEY (2005), 
http://www.mdri.org/projects/turkey/turkey%20final%209-26-05.pdf; Press Release, Mental Dis-
ability Rights lnt'l, European Union Calls on Turkey to Improve Rights of People with Mental 
Disabilities (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.mdri.org/projects/turkey/MDRI_EU_PressRelease.pdf; Press 
Release, Mental Disability Rights Int'l, Human Rights Group Accuses Turkey of Torture Against 
Children and Adults with Mental Disabilities (Sept. 28, 2005), http://www.mdri.org/projects/turkey/ 
TurkeyPressRelease.pdf. For updated information on the European Union's activities, including 
ascension decisions, see European Union, EUROPA-Gateway to the European Union, http:// 
europa.eu/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2008). 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42 (noting that no direct benefits were conditioned 
on acceptance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). 
20. P. 72. For a representative catalogue of recent scholarship, seep. 115. 
21. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 4, at 170 (2004) ("network norms"); Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey, supra note I, at 2613 (transnational legal process theory). 
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in Rational Choice are at once simple and far reaching. Guzman defines a 
state's reputation for international legal compliance as its "past response to 
international legal obligations used to predict future compliance with such 
obligations" (p. 73). In other words, he suggests that prior conformity in-
forms the probability of future acquiescence. States value their reputation as 
conformers with international agreements because that characterization en-
hances the likelihood that other states will be willing to cooperate with them 
in the future (p. 34). In essence, the better a complier a state has been in the 
past, the more cooperative benefit that state will gain in the future. 
The book embeds its straightforward observation regarding reputation as 
an indicator of future compliance in a much more complex analysis. Ra-
tional Choice recognizes that measuring only past compliance by a state 
inadequately predicts the future willingness of that state to enter into and 
comply with international agreements (p. 73-74). Rather, it is the context in 
which a state chooses to honor or breach its obligations that informs these 
determinations (pp. 74-76). 
Guzman identifies three factors that influence whether a particular ac-
tion will affect a state's reputation. These are "(1) the nonreputational 
payoffs a state is facing; (2) the state's existing reputation at the time of the 
action; and (3) the importance of the obligations to other states" (p. 77). He 
also carefully analyzes the role uncertainty plays in divining a state's reputa-
tion for compliance from its behavior. For example, the more uncertain a 
performance standard is, the less clear that a state's behavior is violating that 
standard. Hence, a state's action when assessed in light of ambiguous cir-
cumstances will be less likely to affect its reputation as a complier than if 
the act were a clear violation of an agreement (p. 97). Guzman thus paints 
an elegant picture of states complying with international agreements in or-
der to actively advance their reputation as compliers. At the same time, he 
recognizes that the signals sent by compliance are themselves qualified by a 
number of contextual and other factors. 
Despite its insights, Guzman's overarching theory falls short of provid-
ing a full account of reputation in international law. At the core of this 
limitation is the fact that reputational forces become relevant only after a 
state's legal obligations exist. That is, because a state's reputation is influ-
enced only by its compliance with legal obligations, reputational harm can 
only occur if a legal obligation already exists. Put a different way, failure to 
join a treaty would have no reputational consequences within the Rational 
Choice framework. Consequently, Guzman's rational choice analysis leaves 
us with a conundrum: it cannot explain the formation of human rights trea-
ties without relying on something akin to reputational benefits, yet the 
reputational mechanism that it develops does not sufficiently account for the 
process of treaty formation. 
C. The Need for a More Robust Reputational Mechanism 
Guzman's choice to limit the role of reputation to its influence on future 
compliance does not adequately explain current compliance with human 
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rights treaties, nor does it explain state decisions to enter into such treaties. 
To the extent these shortcomings arise in the human rights context, they are 
similarly applicable to other areas of international law addressed by 
Guzman's framework. 22 
We focus here on the limitations of the type of parsimonious rational-
actor theory proposed in Rational Choice.23 To the extent a rational-actor 
model is used to explain state behavior, we would suggest that it start from 
the baseline proposition that cooperation with other states is beneficial. As 
we have argued elsewhere, regular cooperation with other states leads to a 
desire for esteem from the other states with which a state cooperates.24 Pur-
suant to this preference-for-esteem model, reputational concerns can 
influence a state to enter into a treaty: a state will do so when the esteem 
benefits it receives from entry outweigh the costs of entry and compliance.25 
This is a model in which cooperation influences a state to enter into treaties, 
but not from any perceived direct benefit.26 This esteem-seeking motivation, 
instead, is an artifact of cooperation. Nor is it limited to a reputation for 
compliance; instead, it is compliance with the treaty norm that generates the 
reputational benefits. This sort of motivation, however, is not accounted for 
in Rational Choice's theory of reputation. 
Generations of scholars beginning with Grotius have noted that states 
seek esteem from the broader global community.27 The "pull of international 
22. Skepticism regarding such accounts of reputation has already been voiced, even by ra-
tional-choice advocates such as Posner and Goldsmith. While recognizing that the rational-choice 
school is broadly compatible with reputation-based theories of compliance, Posner and Goldsmith 
caution that reputational costs of noncompliance only marginally impact state decision making. The 
impact of reputational costs may be reduced by multiple, compartmentalized state reputations across 
different subject areas or overridden by other reputational concerns (such as that of resolve) depend-
ing on the context. The reputational sanctions attaching to noncompliance with certain categories of 
treaties-for instance, those that were poorly negotiated, entered into under compulsion, or reflect 
outmoded international systems-are also suspect. See GOLDSMITH & PosNER, supra note 5, at 100-
04. 
23. We do not seek here to engage an existing debate concerning why individuals signal their 
cooperativeness to others and whether such signaling is rational. For a rational-choice account of 
signaling, see ERIC A. PosNER, LAw AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). For arguments that norms cannot 
be explained fully by rational actor models, see STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 
(2002), and Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 Tut.. 
L. REv. 605 (2004). 
24. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 3, at 93-96. 
25. /d. at 120-25. 
26. Oona Hathaway's scholarship posits this as a central motivation for entering into human 
rights treaties and raises a further concern that ratification may lead to increased human rights viola-
tions. See Hathaway, supra note 16, at 2002-03, 2007. Her thesis is rebutted on both empirical and 
normative grounds by Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Trea-
ties, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003). Both sides in this debate raise important issues, and neither 
side conclusively resolves the quandary. For our argument to this effect, see Geisinger & Stein, 
supra note 3, at 79-81. Rational Choice does not engage this scholarship. 
27. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tucked., Liberty Fund 
2005) (1626); see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27-28 (arguing that compliance derives 
from the need to maintain one's status within a highly interrelated community of states); George W. 
Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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society" is an external force that affects state behavior only to the extent that 
a state is concerned about the regard it receives from other states to which it 
is attracted. Thus, the more a state conforms to perceived group norms, the 
more likely other states perceive it to be strongly attracted to their group and 
approve of that state. The willingness of a state to abide by international 
norms therefore reflects its deep value of acceptance by the global commu-
nity. 
An esteem-seeking mechanism demonstrates how rational self-interest 
leads to an independent desire to maintain relations with other states. It de-
scribes the desire to be members of international society as resulting from 
the benefits states receive through cooperation. That desire, however, exists 
separately from other preferences that rational-actor theorists identify. It is a 
preference for esteem-and not a preference for direct material or economic 
benefit-that serves as a powerful influence on the willingness of states to 
conform to international law. Further, it is a state's rational assessment of 
garnering global esteem, rather than an evaluation of other states' past com-
pliance with treaties, that compels it to enter into treaties in the first place. 
This esteem-seeking mechanism is far removed from Guzman's theory 
that reputation is concerned only with a state's past compliance, or lack of 
compliance, with its international legal obligations. Consequently, the 
framework set forth in Rational Choice cannot adequately account for the 
phenomenon of increased human rights treaties over the last half century.28 
Moreover, limiting discussion of reputation to a simple mechanism, such as 
Rational Choice's straightforward notion that "[w]hen a state fails to com-
ply in one period, other states . . . draw negative inferences about the 
likelihood of future compliance," is unnecessarily reductionist (pp. 39-40). 
Reputation can be a much more complex construct than this simple cal-
culus suggests. Indeed, Guzman seems to veer from his own univocal theory 
when explaining instances of reputation. Take, for example, his discussion 
of South Africa's willingness to dismantle and publicly renounce its suc-
cessfully completed nuclear-arms program. Guzman notes that by the time 
South Africa repudiated nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty,29 political circumstances had lessened their instrumen-
tal value (pp. 80). At the same time, he explains that South Africa was truly 
motivated by a desire "to reform its image as a global pariah" and that "re-
putational considerations ... dictated that it bring itself into compliance 
with international norms" (p. 80). 
S95, S95 (2002) ("International relations theorists and international lawyers have long argued that 
reputational concerns help ensure that states maintain their agreements."). 
28. We note that this limited view of reputation is a general problem associated with all 
rational-choice theories that rely solely on game theory to describe treaty creation. These theories 
only consider reputational factors to play a role in compliance. Failure to consider how a state's 
concern for its reputation affects its willingness to enter into any treaty-not just human rights trea-
ties-and also the many ways in which reputational concerns other than a reputation for compliance 
may influence behavior simply ignores much of existing international lawmaking. 
29. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July I, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
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This account diverges from the book's general reputational theory that 
historical compliance provides information on willingness to act in accor-
dance with new future obligations. For nowhere does Rational Choice 
suggest that compliance signals a state's concern about its reputation as a 
pariah, a very different reputational concern than being viewed as a com-
plier.30 Nor does Rational Choice suggest that compliance signals a general 
willingness to follow international norms. Indeed, if such a desire exists, it 
is hard to understand why that desire would not also lead states to undertake 
other measures in international society, such as ratifying treaties that em-
body international norms in the first place. Thus, discussing behavior of 
states in these terms requires a much broader theory of reputation than Ra-
tional Choice allows.31 
The mechanism of human rights treaty creation is more subtle than that 
envisioned by Rational Choice. The decision to enter into human rights trea-
ties may be based, as Guzman surmises, on a reasoned-action model of 
decision making. However, in order for a rational-actor framework to be 
comprehensive as well as predictive, it must initially assume that states have 
a general desire to be part of global society.32 
To illustrate how the reasoned-actor model used by states in determining 
whether or not to enter into and comply with international law contains a 
broader reputational measure than the elegant but truncated construct prof-
fered by Rational Choice, consider the negotiations leading to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD").33 
Under consideration since 2001,34 the CRPD was deliberated through eight 
Ad Hoc Committee sessions and adopted at a ninth session after technical 
revisions. The treaty was then adopted by general consensus by the General 
30. A pariah is generally defined as an outcast, an actor that is despised and avoided. We 
note that such a definition-particularly to the extent it connotes something that is despised-fits 
much better within a framework of esteem loss than compliance signaling. 
31. Interestingly, one can glean some of these broader arguments in Guzman's earlier schol-
arship. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance· Based Theory of lntemational Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 
1823, 1835-36 (2002) (arguing that nations internalize norms to participate in the transnational legal 
process). 
32. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 3, at 97-109. 
33. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30, 
2007, 46 I.L.M. 443, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubi/IV _15_english.pdf [herein-
after CRPD]. 
34. In December 2001, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider 
enacting a disability-based human rights instrument. United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a Com-
prehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. NRES/56/168 (Dec. 19, 2001). For a detailed description of the political process behind the 
decision to go forward with a convention, see National Council on Disability, UN Disability Con-
vention-Topics at a Glance: History of the Process, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroorn/publications/ 
2003/history _process.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2008). For more background details, including the 
varying position papers submitted by governments and nongovernmental organizations, see United 
Nations, Human Rights and Persons with Disabilities, http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/enable/rights/ 
humanrights.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2008), and Disabled Peoples International, Topics-
Convention, http://v l.dpi.orgllang-en/resources/topics_list?topic=4 (last visited Jan. 12, 2008). 
April2008] Rational Choice 1141 
Assembly on December 13, 2006,35 and was opened for signatures and rati-
fications by states parties on March 30, 2007.36 
According to Guzman's reasoned-actor approach, the decision by any 
individual state whether to enter into the CRPD is predicated on that state's 
rational cost-benefit analysis: "[S]tates must experience some gain as a re-
sult of their engagement with the international legal system, and that gain 
must be larger than what they invest" (p. 12). At the time of the CRPD nego-
tiations, approximately eighty percent of disabled individuals lived in 
developing countries and were subject to material deprivation and social 
exclusion,37 accounting for twenty percent of the world's poorest individu-
als.38 Nevertheless, only about forty of the United Nations' 192 member 
states had domestic disability laws, and the most progressive of those laws 
originated from developed states.39 
For that reason, there are few external indicia of a prenegotiation prefer-
ence among developing states to provide protections to their respective 
disabled populations. Moreover, although the CRPD requires states parties 
to engage in international cooperation, it does not obligate developed states 
to assume developing states' compliance costs.40 There also were no unre-
lated benefits, such as loans or aid, conditioned on acceptance of the CRPD. 
In sum, it is highly implausible to conceive of the CRPD's formulation, and 
particularly the participation of the developing nations (among which 
Mexico was especially prominent), as a consequence of cooperation or co-
ordination among rational actors in the manner that Guzman posits. 
Instead, the formation of and entry into the first human rights treaty of 
the twenty-first century is better explained as a by-product of states wishing 
to be part of a global community that came to be overwhelmingly in favor of 
recognizing the human rights of persons with disabilities. For despite the 
extensive rights acknowledged by the CRPD,41 the instrument was adopted 
35. U.N. treaty focuses on protecting disabled: Convention tells nations to ensure rights of 
world's largest minority, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2006, at A25. 
36. For the number of signatories to the CRPD and its Optional Protocol, as well as general 
background information and media announcements pertinent to the CRPD, see United Nations, 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, http://www.un.org/disabilities (last visited Jan. 26, 
2008). 
37. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEY., THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE USAID DISABILITY POLICY I (2000). For a sense of the varying levels of disability 
reported from country to country, see United Nations Statistics Division, Human functioning and 
disability, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/disability/disab2.asp (last visited Jan. 
12, 2008). 
38. See U.S. AGENCY FOR I NT' L DEY., supra note 37, at I. 
39. See Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and 
Regional Disability Law Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mary Lou Breslin & Sylvia Yee eds., 2002) (providing a catalogue of 
relevant legislation). 
40. See CRPD, supra note 33, art. 32. 
41. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REv. 75, 83-85 (2007). 
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by consensus, is the fastest-ever negotiated and adopted human rights treaty, 
and continues to be entered into at a similar pac·e.42 
More trenchantly, rhetoric surrounding the negotiations and subsequent 
entries into the treaty indicate that states were motivated by a desire to act in 
step with fellow members of the global community. Discussion at the first 
two Ad Hoc Committee sessions focused on whether a separate treaty that 
would clarify rights already contained in existing United Nations instru-
ments was necessary.43 Once consensus was achieved on that central issue 
and a draft set of articles was developed by a Working Group comprising 
states and NGOs, the remaining negotiation sessions were devoted to the 
parameters of a forthcoming convention, with states cooperating towards 
that goal. Notably, developing countries such as China, Costa Rica, and 
Mexico played a key role in the negotiations, each expressing the view that 
a human rights treaty for disabled persons was a positive and necessary 
function of an informed and progressive global society. Perhaps of greatest 
significance is that as of this writing, fourteen of the fifteen states to ratify 
the CRPD are from the developing world.44 
Thus Guzman's rational choice, cost-benefit analysis of international 
law cannot explain the development and entry into of the United Nations' 
most recent human rights treaty. 
CONCLUSION 
Rational Choice contributes to the evolving scholarly debate on why 
states comply with international law by attempting a thorough rational 
choice framework. At the same time, by limiting its explanation of treaty 
formation to cooperation and coordination effects, Rational Choice cannot 
fully explain the influence that reputational forces have on state conduct in 
this area. Consequently, the book falls short of its own laudable ambition-
to set forth a comprehensive theory of rational-actor-based international 
law--even as its efforts meaningfully advance the scholarly debate. 
42. See United Nations, supra note 36. 
43. These observations of the treaty-making process are based on Professor Stein's five years 
of experience as a participant in the CRPD negotiations. 
44. The countries that have ratified the treaty as of February 9, 2008, are Bangladesh, 
Croatia, Cuba, El Salvador, Gabon, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, South Africa, and Spain. 
